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ASCERTAINING THE NOTION OF BOARD ACCOUNTABILITY 
IN CHINESE LISTED COMPANIES 
 
Andrew Keay1 
Jingchen Zhao2 
Abstract:  
Accountability is a concept that has been frequently referred to in Anglo-American 
V\VWHPVDQGLQWKH2(&'¶VFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFHGRFXPHQWVDVZHOODVLQWKH(QJOLVK
translations of corporate governance documents from non-English speaking 
jurisdictions. It is in the Anglo-American literature, in particular, where the word finds 
prominence. It has been suggested in China that accountability is one of the basic 
principles of corporate governance that needs to be consistently enforced.   But does 
this mean that board accountability, as it has been provided for in the Anglo-American 
system, is actually an element of Chinese corporate governance? If not, should it be 
adopted? Or should China develop a concept that is more appropriately included as a 
critical part of its own particular corporate governance needs? The paper aims to 
address these matters in order to ascertain where Chinese corporate governance stands 
on accountability as far as the boards of large listed companies are concerned, and what 
it should do. We opine that while there are elements of accountability in Chinese 
corporate governance, it does not have the form of accountability embraced in Anglo-
American systems. But, it is argued, as China moves from having a system totally based 
on administrative governance to one that is based more on economic governance the 
kind of approach that applies in Anglo-American jurisdictions is likely to become more 
relevant. Within a hybrid corporate governance system combining elements of both 
administrative and economic governanceZHGHYHORSDXQLTXH³wenze V\VWHP´ with 
forms and characters of accountability that is likely to develop to address the needs of 
corporate governance in China and the fostering of its listed companies. 
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Undoubtedly China has become an economic powerhouse over the past twenty years; 
it is now the second largest economy in the world in nominal US dollar terms.3 As part 
of this economic development China has been seeking to develop its commercial 
systems, to encourage the incorporation and expansion of large corporate entities and 
to make sure that these companies are competitive, efficient and attractive for 
investment. Over the last decade company law and corporate governance issues in 
China have received much attention, both in theory and in practice, with the Chinese 
Government making this area a top priority. This is manifested by the establishment of 
many government-funded corporate governance research centres, such as the Chinese 
Centre for Corporate Governance at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.4 The 
focus has been primarily on how to develop an effective corporate governance system 
in order to improve the performance of listed companies and protect their shareholders 
and stakeholders, and with the additional objective of establishing an international 
corporate governance standard. 5  The improvement of corporate governance is an 
ongoing battle that calls for the participation of many people and entities, such as 
regulators, market participants and academics. In order to have standards that are 
congruent with those applied internationally, successive Chinese governments have 
been developing policies to create internationally recognised oversight mechanisms and 
corporate governance models in order to improve public confidence, both domestically 
and internationally. The development of Chinese company law and other related 
legislation and codes of practice has allowed listed companies in China to shape their 
structure in a more modern manner and to imitate their counterparts in developed 
PDUNHWVJLYLQJ&KLQHVHOLVWHGFRPSDQLHVD³:HVWHUQDSSHDUDQFH´ 
 
An important aspect of Chinese economic development is ensuring that the corporate 
governance environment in which companies are to operate is rigorous and respected. 
For some years China has been concerned that its corporate governance framework 
should accord with OECD recommendations, and that it should meet international 
standards.  
                                                 
3
  China-Britain Business Council: 
http://www.cbbc.org/who_we_are/china_context/uk_china_factfile (accessed on 4th November 2015). 
4
  6HH&+DZHVDQG7&KLX³)ORJJLQJDGHDGKRUVH":K\:HVWHUQ-style corporate governance 
UHIRUPZLOOIDLOLQ&KLQDDQGZKDWVKRXOGEHGRQHLQVWHDG"´006) 20 Australian Journal of Corporate 
Law 25. 
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(2008) 19 China Economic Review 460 at 460. 
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The board of directors, which is granted broad powers in order to manage a company, 
plays a major role in corporate life in any jurisdiction. Various sources have identified 
the accountability of boards as a critical issue in the governance of companies. The 
8.¶V Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance 
(commonly known as the ³Cadbury Report´ VDLGLQWKDW³The issue for corporate 
governance is how to strengthen the accountability of boards of directors to 
VKDUHKROGHUV´6 According to the G20/2(&'¶V Principles of Corporate Governance 
the corporate governance framework should ensure the accountability of boards to the 
company and the shareholders. 7  It has been stated on many occasions that good 
corporate governance is best achieved by focusing on the accountability of directors. It 
has been argued that accountability of directors is the basis for the success of all other 
principles of corporate governance.8 Holding directors accountable for their behaviour 
and decisions is fundamental to good corporate governance.9 Clearly, in the main, 
accountability is seen as something that is good and commendable. In fact, it has been 
said that ³accountability´ has become an icon of good governance, 10  and board 
accountability has been held up as a cornerstone of effective corporate governance.11 
Boards in Anglo-American jurisdictions12 enjoy very wide powers and discharge a 
whole range of functions, making them the very centre of companies.13 The board of 
                                                 
6
  1 December 1992, Gee, under the chairmanship of Sir Adrian Cadbury, at para 6.1 and 
accessible at : http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf (accessed on 8th July 2015). 
7
  G20/OECD, Principles of Corporate Governance 2015, at 51 and accessible at:  
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Corporate-Governance-Principles-ENG.pdf (accessed on 15th September 
2015). 
8
  ( 0DNXWD ³7RZDUGV *RRG &RUSRUDWH *RYHUQDQFH LQ 6WDWH-Owned Industries: The 
$FFRXQWDELOLW\RI'LUHFWRUV´Malawi Law Journal 55 at 56. While the author was writing about 
the corporate governance of State Owned Enterprises, it is argued that the comment is just as applicable 
to the normal commercial public company. 
9
  J. Solomon and A. Solomon, Corporate Governance and Accountability (John Wiley & Sons, 
2004), at 14. 
10 
 0'XEQLFN	.<DQJµ7KHPursuit of $FFRXQWDELOLW\3URPLVH3UREOHPVDQG3URVSHFWV¶LQ
D.C. Menzel & H.L. White (edns), The State of Public Administration: Issues, Challenges and 
Opportunities (Routledge  2011), 171. 
11
  $<RXQJ³&RUSRUDWH*RYHUQDQFHLQ&KLQDDQG+RQJ.RQJ5HFRQFLOLQJ7raditional Chinese 
9DOXHV 5HJXODWRU\ ,QQRYDWLRQ DQG $FFRXQWDELOLW\´  DW  DQG DFFHVVLEOH DW
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1533904 (accessed on 8 July 2015). 
12
  This includes many countries, such as the UK, the US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. 
13
  For example, in relation to the UK see the Companies Act 2006, s.172(1). In relation to the US 
see ++DQVPDQQDQG5.UDDNPDQµ7KH(QGRI+LVWRU\IRU&RUSRUDWH/DZ¶Georgetown Law 
Journal 439; G. Ha\GHQ DQG 0 %RGLH ³6KDUHKROGHU 3ULPDF\ DQG WKH &XULRXV 7XUQ 7RZDUG %RDUG
3ULPDF\´William and Mary Law Review 2071 at 2081; Dodge v Ford (1919) 170 NW 668 at 
684 (Mich). In relation to Australia, see the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and 
Financial Services, Commonwealth of Australia, Corporate Responsibility: Managing Risk and Creating 
Value (2006) Chapter 4 and accessible at: 
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directors in China also has broad powers and functions. It is the de facto decision-
making body of the company, 14  and it is regarded as an important mechanism in 
providing for sound corporate governance.15 Article 46 of &KLQD¶VCompany Law 2005 
provides that the board of directors has, inter alia, the following functions and powers: 
deciding on the operational plans of the company; formulating the financial budget plan 
and final accounts for the year; formulating plans for profit distribution and for making 
up the losses of the company; preparing plans for the increase or reduction of capital 
and the issue of corporate bonds; determining what administrative bodies need to be 
established; appointing or dismissing the manager of the company; and deciding on the 
management system of the company. In China, as in many other countries around the 
world such as Germany, Austria and the Netherlands,16 companies have two boards, 
namely a board of management and a board of supervision. 17  However, unlike 
supervisory boards in other nations, and particularly Germany, this type of board in 
China has limited powers. For instance, it does not appoint the members of the board 
of directorsWKH\DUHDSSRLQWHGE\WKHVKDUHKROGHUV¶PHHWLQJ18 
 
Accountability is a concept that is frequently referred to in Anglo-American systems 
DQG LQ WKH 2(&'¶V GRFXPHQWV, as well as in the English translations of corporate 
governance documents from non-English-speaking jurisdictions. It is in the Anglo-
American literature in particular where the word finds prominence. The word is peculiar 
to the English language, but nevertheless it has been considered to be an important 
element in other systems. For example, the Brazilians became so frustrated with the fact 
that Portuguese does not have an equivalent word for accountability that the English 
word has been officially accepted as part of its formal lexicon.19 The Japanese have 
                                                 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Corporations_and_Financial_Servic
es/Completed_inquiries/2004-07/corporate_responsibility/report/index (accessed on 8th July 2015); 
&RUSRUDWLRQVDQG0DUNHWV$GYLVRU\&RPPLWWHHµ7KH6RFLDO5HVSRQVLELOLW\RI&RUSRUDWLRQV¶'HFHPEHU
2006 at pp.102±113 and accessible at 
http://www.camac.gov.au/camac/camac.nsf/byHeadline/PDFFinal+Reports+2006/$file/CSR_Report.pd
f (accessed on 8th July 2015). 
14
  Y. Kang, L. Shi and E. Brown, Chinese Corporate Governance (Santa Monica, Rand 
Corporation, 2008) at 14. 
15
  +/LXDQG0)RQJ³%RDUGFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIPHGLXPWRODUJH&KLQHVHFRPSDQLHV´
Corporate Governance 163 at 163. 
16
  Companies in the Netherlands can now choose to have a single board, but two tier boards still 
predominate. 
17
  See article 118 of the Company Law 2005. 
18
  See article 38(2) of the Company Law 2005. 
19
  0 - 'XEQLFN µ$FFRXQWDELOLW\ DV &XOWXUDO .H\ZRUG¶  LQ 0 %RYHQV 5( *RRGLQ 7
Schillenmans (edns) The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability (Oxford University Press) at 23. 
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many words for responsibility but only one term that equates to accountability, and that 
is a transliteration of the English word.20 This manifests the fact that the meaning of 
words and concepts can be lost in translation. 
 
It has been suggested in China that accountability is one of the basic principles of 
corporate governance that needs to be consistently enforced. 21  So, some form of 
accountability as far as boards are concerned is a critical element of a well-functioning 
corporate governance system, but what sort of concept of accountability is provided for 
in China? Is it the same or similar to that provided for in the Anglo-American system? 
If not, should that applying in the latter be adopted? Or should China develop a concept 
that is more appropriate for its own particular corporate governance needs? The paper 
aims to address these matters in order to ascertain where Chinese corporate governance 
stands on accountability as far as the boards of large listed companies are concerned, 
and what it should do.  
 
Tackling these issues is important given the fact that many Chinese government and 
non-government bodies have made it clear that accountability of boards is an integral 
aspect of Chinese corporate governance. Understanding and developing accountability 
LQ &KLQD LQ D ZD\ WKDW LV DSSURSULDWH IRU &KLQD¶V FXUUHQW needs and aspirations is 
particularly important so as to provide guidance, especially for legislators, boards of 
directors, those drafting corporate reports, codes and legislation, shareholders and 
stakeholders. An appreciation of what accountability involves as a concept is necessary 
in constructing appropriate mechanisms that will ensure that accountability occurs. The 
paper argues that there is uncertainty concerning the meaning of accountability in 
Chinese corporate governance, and it certainly is not equivalent to the approach adopted 
in Anglo-American jurisdictions. It is argued that Chinese corporate governance should 
not borrow the Anglo-American concept of accountability in corporate governance, 
although it can learn from it, but rather it should embrace ZKDWZHWHUPDVD³wenze 
                                                 
20
  Ibid at 23.  
21
  ProtivLWL&KLQDDQG&KLQHVH$FDGHP\RI6RFLDO6FLHQFHV³&RUSRUDWH*RYHUQDQFH$VVHVVPHQW
Summary Report on the Top 100 Chinese Listed Companies for 2012 at 1: 
http://www.protiviti.co.uk/China-en/Documents/CN-en-2012-Corporate-Governance-Survey-
Report.pdf (accessed on 8th July 2015) 
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system´RIDFFRXQWDELOLW\WKDWZLOOHQKDQFHFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFHDQGEHDEOHWRdevelop 
a unique Chinese approach to fit into its unique corporate governance.22 
 
The paper is structured as follows. First, there is a consideration of the meaning of 
accountability in corporate governance with an emphasis on board accountability. 
Second, the paper introduces the concept of hybrid corporate governance that operates 
in China and identifies the nature of listed companies in China with a focus on the 
power behind these companies. This is followed by an examination of whether the 
concept of accountability, as envisaged in Anglo-American systems, has been 
understood in China and is operating in Chinese companies and a proposal for an 
accountability system that is unique, dynamic and workable in Chinese corporate 
governance. The discussion includes a linguistic analysis of legal documentation and 
some empirical research undertaken in relation to corporate reports in various industrial 
sectors and academic arguments relating to developing the accountability of boards in 
China through the employment of what is called a ³wenze system´ of accountability. 
Fourthly, consideration is given to the way that accountability has been used in the 
context of administrative law in China in order to determine whether that could 
contribute to developing a Chinese approach to accountability. Finally, there are some 
concluding remarks. 
 
II The Notion of Accountability  
 
So, as mentioned earlier, board accountability is important, with the 8.¶VDepartment 
for Business Innovation and Skills finding that along with transparency it is the most 
important element of good corporate governance.23 Other commentators have said that 
to improve corporate governance practices it is necessary to foster the effectiveness and 
                                                 
22
  This is in accord with the recommendations of the Asian Development Bank : Governance : 
Sound Development Management, 19DQGUHIHUUHGWRLQ-,XDQG-%DWWHQ³7KH,PSOHPHQWDWLRQRI
OECD Corporate Governance Principles in Post-&ULVLV$VLD´Journal of Corporate 
Citizenship 47 at 51. 
23
  The definition originally appeared at : http://www.berr.gov.uk/bbf/corp-
governance/page15267.html, but now this has been superseded by the following link: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090902193559/berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/businesslaw/corp-
governance/page15267.html (accessed  on 8th July 2015). 
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accountability of boardrooms.24The G20/OECD stated that: ³The corporate governance 
framework should ensure the strategic guidance of the company, the effective 
monitoring of management by WKHERDUGDQGWKHERDUG¶VDFFRXQtability to the company 
and the shareholders´25 But what does accountability in this context actually entail? 
We consider this from an Anglo-American perspective given WKDWµDFFRXQWDELOLW\¶LVDQ
English word and the concept of accountability has been emphasised repeatedly in 
Anglo-American jurisdictionsDQGWUDQVQDWLRQDOFRGHVVXFKDVWKH2(&'¶VPrinciples 
of Corporate Governance have obviously based their reference to accountability on the 
Anglo-American approach. 
 
Although accountability has been mentioned frequently in the corporate governance 
literature, has been used often in definitions of corporate governance, and has been 
relied on as a critical factor in corporate governance by a variety of sources,26 there 
have been few attempts to explain what it actually means, certainly in the context of 
corporate governance. This is to be contrasted with other areas of law and society, such 
as public administration, politics and even administrative law, where there have been 
several attempts to articulate and develop the notion of accountability.27 The reason 
                                                 
24
  ,)LODWRWFKHYHWDOµ.H\'ULYHUVRI³*RRG´&RUSRUDWH*RYHUQDQFHDQd the Appropriateness of 
8. 3ROLF\ 5HVSRQVHV¶ )LQDO 5HSRUW -DQXDU\  '7, DW S DQG DFFHVVLEOH DW
http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file36671.pdf (accessed on 8th July 2015). 
25
  G20/OECD, Principles of Corporate Governance 2015, at 51 and accessible at:  
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Corporate-Governance-Principles-ENG.pdf (accessed on 15th September 
2015). 
26
  For example, see, S. Demirag, Corporate governance, accountability and pressure to perform: 
An international study (Stamford, Conn, JAI Press, 1998); D. Bavly, Corporate Governance and 
Accountability: What Role for the Regulator, Director and Auditor?  (Westport, Quorum Books, 1999); 
R. Warren, Corporate Governance and Accountability (Liverpool, Liverpool Academic Press, 2000); R. 
$JXLOHUD ³&RUSRUDWH JRYHUQDQFH DQG 'LUHFWRU $FFRXQWDELOLW\  DQ ,QVWLWXWLRQDO &RPSDUDWLYH
3HUVSHFWLYH´British Journal of Management 65-RQHV³/DZ1RUPVDQGWKH%UHDNGRZQ
RIWKH%RDUG3URPRWLQJ$FFRXQWDELOLW\LQ&RUSRUDWH*RYHUQDQFH´Iowa Law Review 105; H. 
+XWFKLVRQ³'LUHFWRU3ULPDF\DQG&RUSRUDWH*RYHUQDQFH6KDUHKROGHU9RWLQJ5LJKWV&DSWXUHGE\WKH
AFFRXQWDELOLW\$XWKRULW\3DUDGLJP´Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 1111; P. Koh et 
DO³$FFRXQWDELOLW\DQG9DOXH(QKDQFHPHQW5ROHVRI&RUSRUDWH*RYHUQDQFH´Accounting and 
Finance. 305; 1%UHQQDQDQG-6RORPRQ³&RUSRUDWHJRYHUQDnce, accountability and mechanisms of 
DFFRXQWDELOLW\ DQ RYHUYLHZ´   Accounting Auditing and Accountability Journal 885; 
Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee, Guidance for Directors (Canberra, Australian 
Government, April 2010) at pp.13±15 and accessible at: 
http://www.camac.gov.au/camac/camac.nsf/byHeadline/PDFFinal+Reports+2010/$file/Guidance_for_
directors_Report_April2010.pdf (accessed  on 8th July 2015). 
27
  )RULQVWDQFHVHH%5RP]HNDQG0'XEQLFN µ$FFRXQWDELOLW\LQWKH3XEOLF6HFWRU/HVVRQV
IURP WKH &KDOOHQJHU 7UDJHG\¶   Public Administration Review 223; R Mulgan, 
µ³$FFRXQWDELOLW\´ $Q (YHU ([SDQGLQJ &RQFHSW"¶   Public Administration 555; R Mulgan, 
Holding Power to Account: Accountability in Modern Democracies (London, Palgrave MacMillan, 
3-RVDQG07RPSNLQVµ7KH$Fcountability Paradox in an Age of Reinvention: The Perennial 
3UREOHP RI 3UHVHUYLQJ &KDUDFWHU DQG -XGJPHQW¶   Administration and Society 255; L. 
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might be that accountability is notoriously difficult to articulate; it is certainly a 
complicated and elusive concept.28 Therefore, a sense of what accountability actually 
involves in a precise way has been lacking.29   
 
It has been argued, and we accept it here for the purposes of discussion and analysis, 
that accountability in relation to corporate governance, certainly as far as Anglo-
American corporate governance is concerned, entails a process involving several 
stages.30 Before considering these stages it must be recognised that for accountability 
to occur, boards (the accountor) need to accept responsibility for their actions or 
inactions.31  If boards fail to acknowledge the fact that accountability constitutes a 
critical aspect of corporate governance, there cannot be worthwhile and effective 
accountability to the accountee (the shareholders). Unless boards take responsibility, 
they are likely to engage in thwarting the effectiveness of many of the accountability 
mechanisms that have been established. If a person is not responsible for something, in 
the sense either of being assigned particular duties in respect of it or of having caused 
the end result, he or she would not usually be held to account for it.32 Acceptance of the 
need for board members to be accountable does not, of itself, necessarily demand any 
action, but it is an attitude that should exist within boards. 
 
                                                 
2¶&RQQHOOµ3URJUDP$FFRXQWDELOLW\DVDQ(PHUJHQW3URSHUW\7KH5ROHRI6WDNHKROGHUVLQD3URJUDP¶V
FielG¶   Public Administration Review  & +DUORZ DQG 5 5DZOLQJV µ3URPRWLQJ
$FFRXQWDELOLW\LQ0XOWLOHYHO*RYHUQDQFH$1HWZRUN$SSURDFK¶European Law Journal 542; 
0%RYHQVµ7ZR&RQFHSWVRI$FFRXQWDELOLW\$FFRXQWDELOLW\DVD9LUWXHDQGDV D0HFKDQLVP¶
33 West European Politics 946. 
28
  R. Behn, Rethinking Democratic Accountability (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 
 DW  $ 6LQFODLU ³7KH &KDPHOHRQ RI $FFRXQWDELOLW\  )RUPV DQG 'LVFRXUVHV´  
Accounting, Organizations and Society 219 at 221; I. Demirag, M. Dubnick and M. Khadaroo, 
³([SORULQJ WKH 5HODWLRQVKLS %HWZHHQ $FFRXQWDELOLW\ DQG 3HUIRUPDQFH LQ WKH 8.¶V 3ULYDWH ,QLWLDWLYH
3),´DWS± SDSHUSUHVHQWHGDWWKH³&RQIHUHQFHRQ*RYHUQLQJWKH&RUSRUDWLRQ0DSping the Loci of 
3RZHU LQ&RUSRUDWH*RYHUQDQFH'HVLJQ´DW4XHHQ¶V8QLYHUVLW\%HOIDVW±21 September 2004; A. 
6LQFODLU ³7KH &KDPHOHRQ RI $FFRXQWDELOLW\ )RUPV DQG 'LVFRXUVHV´   Accounting, 
Organizations and Society  DW  0 %RYHQV ³$QDO\sing and Assessing Accountability : A 
&RQFHSWXDO)UDPHZRUN´European Law Journal 447 at 448, 449. 
29
  0'XEQLFN³7KHPursuit of $FFRXQWDELOLW\3URPLVH3UREOHPVDQG3URVSHFWV´DW
and accessible at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1548922 (accessed on 8th July 2015). 
30
  6HH $ .HD\ DQG - /RXJKUH\ ³7KH )UDPHZRUN IRU %RDUG $FFRXQWDELOLW\ LQ &RUSRUDWH
*RYHUQDQFH´Legal Studies 252. 
31
  Canadian Democracy and Corporate Accountability Commission, Canadian Democracy and 
Corporate Accountability: An Overview of Issues, Toronto, 2001 at iii. 
32
  50XOJDQµ³$FFRXQWDELOLW\´$Q(YHU([SDQGLQJ&RQFHSW"¶Public Administration 
555 at 561. 
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Accountability generally, and certainly in the context of corporate governance, is not 
about a simple single meaning. It is a highly nuanced word. It is argued that there are 
in fact four stages involved in the accountability of boards,33 all of which contribute to 
the meaning of the word. The first stage is the board providing accurate information 
concerning its decisions and actions, so that shareholders are informed as to what has 
been done by it on behalf of the company. A part of this is transparency, which involves 
making disclosure and providing reports concerning the work of the board.34  The 
second stage involves a board explaining and justifying the things for which it is 
responsible, including what it has done and what it has failed to do.35 Often this is seen 
as the predominant aspect of accountability, involving the board being answerable for 
what it has done, and it is the stage that is often focused on by elements of the 
accountability literature dealing with other areas of society and law. This stage requires 
the board to justify and explain what it has done (or not done), and why. The third stage 
is constituted by the questioning and evaluating of the ERDUG¶Vreasons given for what 
has been done. Fourth, the final stage is that there is the possibility, but not the 
requirement, of the imposition of consequences. This might simply entail the provision 
of feedback to the board. It might, but it need not, constitute negative consequences 
which could involve some sort of sanction, perhaps involving the removal of one or 
more directors or the decision not to re-elect a director when his or her term comes to 
an end. 
 
III A Hybrid Corporate Governance Model and the Controlling Power of Chinese 
Listed Companies 
Before addressing the issue of accountability in the boards of Chinese companies, it is 
necessary to establish, albeit briefly, the framework of corporate governance in which 
any form of accountability will operate in China and to introduce the nature of power 
in Chinese companies. 
 
                                                 
33
  $.HD\DQG-/RXJKUH\³7KH)UDPHZRUNIRU%RDUG$FFRXQWDELOLW\LQ&RUSRUDWH*RYHUQDQFH´
(2015) 35 Legal Studies 252. 
34
  $ /LFKW ³$FFRXQWDELOLW\ DQG &RUSRUDWH *RYHUQDQFH´  DW   DQG DFFHVVLEOH DW
http://ssrn.com/abstract=328401 (accessed on 8th July 2015). 
35
  $FFRXQW$ELOLW\µ$$)UDPHZRUN6WDQGDUGVIRU6RFLDODQG(WKLFDO$FFRXQWLQJ$XGLWLQJ
DQG 5HSRUWLQJ¶ 1RYHPEHU   DFFHVVLEOH DW
http://www.accountability.org/images/content/0/7/076/AA1000%20Overview.pdf (accessed on 8th July 
2015). 
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Corporate governance in China has emerged and developed in line with the shift of the 
Chinese economy from a planned to a market model. Unlike classic corporate 
governance models, the governance model adopted by Chinese listed firms can best be 
described as a control-based system, in which the controlling shareholders, and this is 
SUHGRPLQDQWO\ WKH 6WDWH RU 6WDWH RIILFLDOV ³WLJKWO\ FRQWURO OLVWHG FRPSDQLHV WKURXJK
concentrated owneUVKLSDQGPDQDJHPHQWIULHQGO\ERDUGV´36 This control-based model 
is a hybrid due to the gradual transition that is taking place in China, namely from 
administrative governance to economic governance, something that has been occurring 
over the past three decades during the transformation of the Chinese economy from a 
planned to a market model.37 It has meant that now China has a hybrid model with both 
administrative and economic dimensions. These two elements of governance are 
expected to co-exist and develop an equilibrium in China over a long period, during 
which there will inevitably be various institutional and ideological obstacles to be 
overcome. 38  The transition that has taken place thus far has led to a corporate 
governance model that is now characterised by gradualism, dualism, systematisation 
and path dependency.39 Any transition in the style of corporate governance can only be 
achieved through a long process and during this time both administrative and economic 
corporate governance models will co-exist. This transformation is a systematic one due 
to developments in legislation and legal enforcement, as well as changes in the nature 
of the shareholding ownership structure, all of which follows from the influence of 
Chinese traditions, history, values and culture.  
 
Within the administrative corporate governance mode directors of State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) are appointed directly by the Chinese government, and directors 
always retain certain administrative roles within the government while also acting as 
                                                 
36
  4/LXµ&RUSRUDWH*RYHUQDQFHLQ&KLQD&XUUHQW3UDFWLFHV(FRQRPLF(IIHFWVDQG,QVWLWXWLRQDO
'HWHUPLQDQWV¶  CESifo Economic Studies 415 at 429; see also N.W. Leung and M. Cheng, 
µ&RUSRUDWH*RYHUQDQFHDQG)LUP9DOXH(YLGHQFHIURP&KLQHVH6WDWH-&RQWUROOHG/LVWHG)LUPV¶
6 China Journal of Accounting Research 89.  
37
  :/L<;X-1LXDQG$4LXµ$6XUYH\RI&RUSRUDWH*RYHUQDQFH,QWHrnational Trends and 
&KLQD¶V0RGH¶Nankai Business Review International 4 at 5±7; see also W. Li, X. Chen and Q. 
Yuan, Chinese Corporate Governance: Road to Transition and Perfection (ѝഭޜਨ⋫⨶˖ 䖜ර оᆼ
ழѻ䐟) (Beijing: China Machine Press 2012) 139±141. 
38
  See W. Li, X. Chen and Q. Yuan, Chinese Corporate Governance: Road to Transition and 
Perfection (ѝഭޜਨ⋫⨶˖ 䖜ර оᆼழѻ䐟) (Beijing: China Machine Press 2012) 140. 
39
  : /L DQG ' <DQ µ7UDQVLWLRQ IURP $GPLQLVWUDWLYH WR (FRQRPLF 0RGHO RI &RUSRUDWH
Governance: A 1HZ$QDO\WLFDO)UDPHZRUNIRU5HVHDUFKRQ&KLQD¶V&RUSRUDWH*RYHUQDQFH¶
Nankai Business Review International 4. 
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directors. Under this administrative corporate governance system the government 
always intervenes in the business decision-making process by the employment of 
administrative actions. This approach has been subject to criticism based on the fact 
that it produces an inefficient system of operation.  
 
The first and second rounds of privatisation of SOEs started in 1979 and 2014 
respectively, when thousands of poorly performing national and regional SOEs were 
privatised or liquidated.40 This manifests the transformation that is occurring, from a 
purely administrative model to a hybrid one.   
 
While, administrative corporate governance involves significant political involvement 
in the governance process, elsewhere in the world economic corporate governance is 
dominant. For instance, in Anglo-American systems there tends to be a focus on the 
economic power of companies, and as far as many companies are concerned this 
involves the directors running the company so that it makes as much profit as possible 
and in such a way as to lead to the maximisation of the wealth of shareholders. The 
model prevails in common law countries with an effective legal enforcement of 
shareholder rights. Corporate law provides relatively extensive protections for 
shareholders, and also courts are relatively active in enforcing those protections.    
 
The long-term coexistence of administrative and economic corporate governance is a 
unique element in China. The main characteristic of administrative corporate 
JRYHUQDQFHLQ&KLQDOLHVLQWKH³DGministrativisDWLRQ´RIUHVRXUFHDOORFDWLRQFRUSRUDWH
objectives, and the appointment and removal of senior executives. The political 
involvement in, and impact on, corporate governance is seen as one of the 
manifestations of administrative corporate governance.41 The goal of reform in China, 
consistent with the reform of the modern enterprise system, is to change this dual character of 
corporate governance in the direction of pure economic governance, the latter being regarded, 
comparatively speaking, as a more mature and efficient approach to promoting company 
                                                 
40
  6HH*:LOGDXµ&KLQD.LFNVRII6HFRQG5RXQGRI3ULYDWLVDWLRQ¶$XJXVWDYDLODEOHYLD
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ec28674c-13ac-11e4-84b7-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3DOzmmx3b (accessed 
on 15th September 2014). 
41
  :/L $4LX DQG =*X µ'XDO&RUSRUDWH *RYHUQDQFH(QYLURQPHQW 3ROLWLFal Connections 
Preference and Firm Performance ± 6WXG\RQ*RYHUQDQFH7UDQVLWLRQRI&KLQD¶V3ULYDWH/LVWHG)LUPV
ৼ䟽ޜਨ⋫⨶⧟ຳ_᭯⋫㚄㌫ٿྭоޜਨ㔙᭸_สҾѝഭ≁㩕кᐲޜਨ⋫⨶䖜රⲴ⹄ウ) (2010) 6 
China Industrial Economics 85 at 94. 
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success.42 This transformation is characterised by the weakening of administrative governance 
and the strengthening of economic governance. However, the existing hybrid corporate 
governance model does retain many administrative characteristics and it continues to be subject 
to strong government interference and reliance on government support and direction. It is also 
shaped by top-down bureaucratic intervention and government control through the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VFRQWUROOLQJSRZHURYHUFRUSRUDWHPDQDJHPHQWYLDDJHQWV appointed by the State 
who were previously government officials.43 Therefore, an understanding and interpretation of 
KRZ³DFFRXQWDELOLW\´ZRUNV LQDGPLQLVWUDWLYH ODw will be helpful and appropriate to inform 
corporate governance research in China at the present time, and, perhaps, for some time in the 
future.  
Under this unique hybrid corporate governance model, listed companies in China can 
be divided into two broad groups: SOEs, and listed companies that are not controlled 
E\ WKH 6WDWH UHIHUUHG WR KHUH DV ³SULYDWH FRPSDQLHV´ HYHQ WKRXJK WKH\ DUH SXEOLF
companies as their shares are available to the public in general). Until early 2000 a 
reference to a listed company normally referred to listed SOEs, since before that date 
the overwhelming majority of listed companies were SOEs, whose largest shareholder 
normally is the State. Since then efforts have been made by the Chinese government to 
reduce the concentration of state shareholding, and it has a general objective to create 
a more dispersed and competitive shareholding structure, corporatisation and 
ownership diversification. This has led to the emergence of new owners such as 
individual minority shareholders, institutional investors, and employee shareholders.44 
But by September 2014, listed private companies outnumbered SOEs. While there are 
1007 SOEs listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, there are 1562 
private companies.45 As for the SOEs, the very high concentration of ownership is 
directly linked to control of the board of directors, which is regarded as a critical link 
                                                 
42
  As indicated earlier, the pursuit of economic goals does not necessarily mean that social and 
environmental concerns have to be eschewed by companies. Clearly many Anglo-American companies 
have policies on corporate social responsibility. 
43
  01<RXQJ0:3HQJ'$KOVWURP*'%UXWRQDQG<-LDQJµ&RUSRrate Governance in 
Emerging Economies: A Review of the Principal-3ULQFLSDO 3HUVSHFWLYH¶   Journal of 
Management Studies 196 at 211. 
44
  S. Tenev, C. Zhang and L. Brefort, Corporate Governance and Enterprise Reform in China: 
Building the Institutions of Modern Market, Washington, DC, World Bank and the International Finance 
Corporation (2002) pp.2±3. 
45
  See Statistics of China Securities Regulatory Commission, September 2014 available via 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/G00306204/zqscyb/201410/t20141028_262444.htm (accessed on  
4th 1RYHPEHUVHHDOVR-/LXµ&65&6WDWH2ZQHGDQG&RQWUROOHGOLVWHG&RPSDQ\RZQPDUNHW
capitalisation of 16 Trillian RMB (䇱ⴁՊ˖ഭᴹ᧗㛑кᐲޜਨᙫᐲ٬ 16зӯ¶th November, 
China Economics Weekly.  
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between ownership and control in the current Chinese corporate governance scheme.46 
When SOEs are listed, they are predominately owned and controlled by central or 
regional governments, with at least 50 per cent (and usually more) of their shares held 
by government entities. The State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC) acts as the largest shareholder, and the chairman of the board of directors is 
usually a representative of the management of SASAC who will consult with the board 
and nominate the directors of SOEs.47 The decisions made by the board will be based 
significantly on what are the interests of the largest shareholder. 6$6$&¶VPDQGDWHLV
WR³RZQ´WKHVHOLVWHGFRPSDQLHVDQGGLUHFWWKHPLQWKHLQWHUHVWVRIWKHSXEOLF6$6$&
is the ally of these large companies, and it seeks to improve managerial competence 
and capability and increase the value of state-owned assets.48 
A limited liability company in China is required by Chinese Company Law 2005 to 
³KDYH D VXSHUYLVRU\ ERDUG FRPSRVHG RI QR OHVV WKDQ WKUHH PHPEHUV´49 who are to 
VXSHUYLVH³WKHDFWVRIWKHGLUHFWRUVDQGVHQLRUH[HFXWLYHVSHUIRUPLQJWKHLUIXQFWLRQV´50 
A two-tier board structure is adopted in China which is similar to the German insider 
model.51  The Chinese &RPSDQ\ /DZ KDV D VHULHV RI VWLSXODWLRQV XSRQ HPSOR\HHV¶
participation and the membership of the board of directors must include representatives 
of the staff and workers of the company.52 Moreover, trade unions also play a crucial 
role in promoting the interests of employees in the Chinese corporate governance 
system carrying out their activities in such a way as to protect the lawful rights and 
interests of the staff.53 For SOEs, their top executives are normally appointed by the 
&RPPXQLVW3DUW\³WKH3arty´ and government agencies and are all veteran socialist 
managers, government officials or Party secretaries.54 Apart from their directorship 
position, they normally have an official title within government that is endorsed by 
                                                 
46
  /+7DQDQG-<:DQJ µ0RGHOLQJDQ(IILFLHQW&RUSRUDWH *RYHUQDQFH6\VWHPIRU&KLQD¶V
Listed State-2ZQHG(QWHUSULVHV,VVXHVDQG&KDOOHQJHVLQD7UDQVLWLRQDO(FRQRP\¶Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies 143 at 147. 
47
  -)+XFKHW DQG;5LFKHU µ&KLQD LQ6HDUFKRI DQ(IILFLHQW&RUSRUDWH *RYHUQDQFH6\VWHP: 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RPSDULVRQDQG/HVVRQV¶&HQWUHIRU(FRQRPLF5HIRUPDQG7UDQVIRUPDWLRQ+HULRW-Watt 
University, Edinburgh, Discussion Paper No 99/01 (11, Feb 1999). 
48
  % 1DXJKWRQ µ6$6$& DQG 5LVLQJ &RUSRUDWH 3RZHU LQ &KLQD¶   China Leadership 
Monitor 1 at 8.   
49
  Article 51, Chinese Company Law 2006. 
50
  Article 53(2), Chinese Company Law 2006.  
51
  Centre for Financial Market Integrity, China Corporate Governance Survey (2007) at 8. 
52
  Article 44 and Article 108, Chinese Company Law 2006. 
53
  Article 18, Chinese Company Law 2006. 
54
  $* :DOGHU µ)URP &RQWURO WR 2ZQHUVKLS &KLQD¶V 0DQDJHULDO 5HYROXWLRQ¶  
Management and Organization Review 19 at 31.  
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government, and this will be at a level that matches WKHLUFRPSDQ\¶VSRVLWLRQ. Many of 
them return to government positions after a stint as executives. The supervisory board, 
as an independent board, offers independent opinions on corporate decisions and 
PRQLWRUVWKHGLUHFWRUV¶H[HFXWLYHPDQDJHPHQW, while the board of directors makes the 
main decisions on the day-to-day operations of the company. It was shown in a recent 
VXUYH\FDUULHGRXWE\WKH&KLQHVH&HQWUHRI&RUSRUDWH*RYHUQDQFHWLWOHG³'HYHORSLQJ
Effective Boards RI'LUHFWRUVRI62(V´,55 that members of the supervisory board are 
encountering difficulties in performing their duties. They are civil servants, and their 
education levels and qualifications are normally lower than those of the directors on the 
main board.56 They also normally have limited knowledge about the company itself. 
Moreover, they are not independent from the board of directors for the following 
reason. It is not surprising in Chinese listed companies that internal directors and senior 
PDQDJHPHQW WHDPV KDYH ³guanxi´ 57  PHDQLQJ ³D FORVH UHODWLRQVKLS´ ZLWK WKH
supervisors, or sometimes individuals even act both as internal directors and 
supervisors (or part-time supervisors) on the supervisory board.58 
 
IV The Concept of Accountability in China 
 
Notwithstanding the use of the word ³DFFRXQWDELOLW\´in the G20/2(&'¶VPrinciples of 
Corporate Governance,59 a document relied on by many developing nations in the 
construction of their corporate governance systems and also considered by the Chinese, 
accountability is, as mentioned earlier, an English word that does not have universal 
application, and appears to be difficult to translate. Even in English there are phrases or 
other words that are seen as conveying all or some elements of the meaning of 
accountability. Examples are ³transparency,´ ³DFFHSWLQJ UHVSRQVLELOLW\´ DQG ³EHLQJ
                                                 
55
  Chinese Centre for Corporate Governance and Chinese Academy of Social Science, Developing 
Effective Boards of Directors of SOEs (2005).  
56
  Corporate Governance Research Group of Nan-kai University and Chinese Commission of 
Economy and Trade, The Internal Corporate Governance Survey of Chinese Listed Corporations (2005). 
57
  )RUGLVFXVVLRQVRQ³guanxi´DQG&KLQHVHFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFHVHH8%UDHQGOH7&DVVHUDQG
-1ROOµ&RUSRUDWH*RYHUQDQFHLQ&KLQD± Is Economic Growth Potential Hindered by Guanxi"¶
16 Business Strategy Review  7: 'XQIHH DQG '( :DUUUHQ µ,V *XDQ[L (WKLFDO" $ 1RUPDWLYH
$QDO\VLVRI'RLQJ%XVLQHVVLQ&KLQD¶ Journal of Business Ethics 191. 
58
  </Lµ&RPSDUDWLYH6WXGLHVRQ6XSHUYLVRU\%RDUGRI/LPLWHG&RUSRUDWLRQV¶LQ66KHQHG
Essays on International Commercial Law II, Beijing: Law Publishing (2002) p.265 (in Chinese). 
59
  G20/OECD, Principles of Corporate Governance 2015, at 51 and accessible at:  
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Corporate-Governance-Principles-ENG.pdf (accessed on 15th September 
2015). 
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DQVZHUDEOH´.60 The word has been difficult to translate into other languages, as the 
concepts that it conveys in English are not readily transferable through another 
language.  
 
A. Elements of Accountability within Chinese Company Law  
 
In order to address the issue of whether WKHQRWLRQRI³DFFRXQWDELOLW\´ or a functional 
equivalent of it exists in Chinese corporate governance, elements of accountability will 
be discussed in this section. Based on the four stages disused in the last section 
including information disclosure, explaining and justifying, questioning and evaluating 
and the imposition of consequences, we can observe, despite lacking a well-developed 
accountability notion, certain elements of board accountability embedded within 
current corporate law legislation.  
 
As for the disclosure of information, it is clear from Article 46 of the Company Law 
2005 that the board of directors shall be accountable to the board of shareholders, and 
shall exercise the functions and powers to report on its work to the board of 
shareholders. Section 33 provides that shareholders shall have the right to examine the 
resolutions of the meetings of both the board of directors and the board of supervisors 
as well as financial and accounting reports. Furthermore, section 37 states that the 
shareholders meeting shall exercise the functions and powers to consider and approve 
reports of the board of directors and other company proposals such as  annual financial 
budgets and final accounts, profit distribution plans and plans for making up losses. 
Section 97 gives the shareholders right to examine minutes of the meetings of the board 
of directors, 61  minutes of the meetings of the board of supervisors, and to give 
suggestions for or inquire about the operation of the company. Specifically on the issue 
of questioning, the director is to attend the VKDUHKROGHUV¶ meeting as a non-voting 
                                                 
60
  6HH0%RYHQVµ7ZRFRQFHSWVRIDFFRXQWDELOLW\¶West European Politics 946 at 
946 and referring to R. Behn, Rethinking Democratic Accountability (Washington, DC, Brookings 
Institution Press, 2001) at 3±6; ' 'XQQ DQG - /HJJH µ86 /RFDO *RYHUQPHQW 0DQDJHUV DQG WKH
FRPSOH[LW\RI5HVSRQVLELOLW\DQG$FFRXQWDELOLW\LQ'HPRFUDWLF*RYHUQDQFH¶Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory 73 at 74; A. Ebrahimi µ7KH 0DQ\ )DFHV RI 1RQSURILW
$FFRXQWDELOLW\¶ +DUYDUG %XVLQHVV 6FKRRO :RUNLQJ 3DSHU  DW  DQG DYDLODEOH DW
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/10-069.pdf (accessed on 3rd April 2014). 
61
  Based on section 48 of Chinese Company Law, the board of directors shall keep minutes of its 
decisions on the matters under its consideration. The directors present at the meeting shall sign the 
minutes of the meeting. 
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attendee and accept inquiries from the shareholders if he or she is required to attend.62 
Thus the Chinese law does provide provisions that allow for a degree of questioning, 
evaluating, explaining and justifying.  The Company Law also imposes consequences 
in some situations where directors account and are found wanting or in situations where 
they fail to be accountable. For example, if directors breach their duties they can be 
held liable to pay compensation in respect of losses to the company.63  
 
While the company law legislation in China does include elements of accountability, it 
does not carry a well-rounded notion of accountability or an equivalent.  Despite the 
significance of the topic itself, the aim of this article is not focused on how to promote 
board accountability, but to ascertain what accountability does exist and how the 
concept could be fostered. Before examining Chinese law any further it is critical that 
a commonly understood and recognised Chinese version of the notion be proposed first.  
 
B. Language Issues 
 
In this part of the paper we examine the Chinese words that have been translated by the 
Chinese as ³accountability´ or ³accountable´ and those Chinese words that have been 
used to translate the same English words in Chinese documents addressing corporate 
governance and corporate law issues, in order to secure a well-rounded picture of how 
the concept of accountability is perceived in China. This includes consideration of 
documents which are translated from English into Chinese to ascertain which Chinese 
word(s) has been used to WUDQVODWH ³DFFRXQWDEOH´ as well as Chinese documents, 
including reports of companies, that have been translated into English and that have 
XVHGWKHZRUG³DFFRXQWDEOH´RU³DFFRXQWDELOLW\´. It has been necessary for translations 
both so that non-&KLQHVHUHDGHUVPLJKWXQGHUVWDQG&KLQHVHFRUSRUDWLRQV¶UHSRUWVDQG
other documents, including Chinese legislation, and Chinese readers can get some 
handle on the relevance of accountability.  
 
The discussion seeks to examine how the Chinese view accountability in the field of 
corporate governance in particular, and to investigate whether the Chinese words 
                                                 
62
 Section 150, Chinese Company Law 2006.  
63
 Section 149, Chinese Company Law 2006. 
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convey the meaning that is encapsulated in the English usage. This linguistic approach 
in ascertaining if there is a term used for corporate governance accountability is 
essential in studying and understanding corporate governance in China and the notion 
of accountability, and it is particularly useful for contributing to the development of 
corporate governance, such as the drafting of the next version of the Chinese corporate 
governance code. The need for an updated code is becoming exceptionally relevant in 
light of the financial crisis of 2008 and due to the age of the existing one.  
 
In relation to accountability in general, it has been said that there is diversity in norms 
and practices among nations and across cultures.64 However, the same commentators 
also note WKDWDFFRXQWDELOLW\LV³DXQLYHUVDOIHDWXUHRIVRFLDOOLIHWKDWLQHYLWDEO\DULVHV
from the norm-HQIRUFHPHQW QHHGV RI JURXSV DQG RUJDQL]DWLRQV´, and that it affects 
nearly all decisions that are made by people.65 Other commentators assert that the 
³accountability of conduct remains a trans-historical and trans-cultural feature of 
KXPDQVRFLDOLW\´66 While Amir Licht argues that it is clearly not a universal norm of 
governance,67 in several Chinese documents that have been published and translated 
into English WKHZRUG³DFFRXQWDEOH´LVXVHGArticle 46 of the Company Law 2005, the 
SULPDU\&KLQHVHOHJLVODWLRQJRYHUQLQJFRPSDQLHVVWDWHV³7KHERDUGRIGLUHFWRUVVKDOO
be accountable to the shareholders [sic] assembly and exercise the following functions 
and powers (㪓һՊሩ㛑ьՊ䍏䍓ˈ㹼֯лࡇ㙼ᵳ)´. This is the translation from the 
RIILFLDO ZHEVLWH RI ³7KH 1DWLRQDO 3HRSOH¶V &RQJUHVV RI WKH 3HRSOH¶V 5HSXEOLF RI
&KLQD´.68 ³$FFRXQWDELOLW\´LVXVHGLQRWKHUtranslations of Chinese documents in other 
corporate contexts. For instance, paragraph 42 of the English translation of the Code of 
Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China SURYLGHV WKDW ³The board of 
directors shall be made accountable to shareholders (㪓һՊੁ㛑ьབྷՊ䍏䍓)´69 The 
                                                 
64
  - /HUQHU DQG 3 7HWORFN ³$FFRXQWDELOLW\ DQG 6RFLDO &RJQLWLRQ´   Encyclopedia of 
Human Behavior DWDQGUHIHUUHGWRLQ$/LFKW³$FFRXQWDELOLW\DQG&RUSRUDWH*RYHUQDQFH´
at 22 and accessible at http://ssrn.com/abstract=328401 (accessed on 8th July 2015). 
65
  Ibid. 
66
  * 6HPLQ DQG $ 0DQVWHDG ³$FFRXQWDELOLW\ RI &RQGXFW $ 6RFLDO 3V\FKRORJLFDO $QDO\VLV´
 DQG UHIHUUHG WR LQ - /HUQHU DQG 3 7HWORFN ³$FFRXQWDELOLW\ DQG 6RFLDO &RJQLWLRQ´  
Encyclopedia of Human Behavior 1 at 1±2. 
67
  $ /LFKW ³$FFRXQWDELOLW\ DQG &RUSRUDWH *RYHUQDQFH´  DW   DQG DFFHVVLEOH DW
http://ssrn.com/abstract=328401 (accessed on 8th July 2015). 
68
  Available via http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384124.htm 
(accessed 8 July 2015). 
69
  Issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission, 7 January 2001 and accessible at: 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/code_en.pdf (accessed on 8th July 2015). 
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same Code states that the supervisory board is to be accountable to all of the 
shareholders (кᐲޜਨⴁһՊᓄੁޘփ㛑ь䍏䍓).70 The word ³accountable´ is used 
on each occasion to translate the same Chinese word, fuze䍏䍓.  
 
In the Chinese version of the ³&RUSRUDWH*RYHUQDQFH$VVHVVPHQWSummary Report on 
the Top 100 Chinese Listed Companies for 2012´SXEOLVKHGE\3URWLYLWL&KLQDDQGWhe 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, WKHZRUG³DFFRXQWDELOLW\´WUDQVODWHVthe Chinese 
words ³wenze jizhi (䰞䍓ᵪࡦ)´, when referring to establishing accountability and 
ensuring information transparency.71 An examination of the Chinese version of the 
OECD¶V Corporate Governance Principles of 2004 shows that ³accountability´ has 
been translated differently on three occasions. In Section 2 E 2 of the Principles 
(providing that ³Anti-take-over devices should not be used to shield management and 
the board from accountability´) it is translated as ³wenze (䰞䍓)´. Meanwhile, it is 
translated as ³shoutuo zeren (ਇᢈ䍓ԫ)´ (which can be directly translated as ³the 
responsibility of trustees´) in Section VI (³«WKHERDUG¶VDFFRXQWDELOLW\WRWKHFRPSDQ\
and the shareholders´), and as ³wenze xing (䰞䍓ᙗ)´ (xing means nature of72) in Part 
I of the Annotations (³Transparent and efficient markets serve to discipline market 
participants and to promote accountability´).  
  
It can be seen from corporate governance codes, statutory provisions, government 
policy papers, CSR reports, and corporate governance reports, that the term 
³DFFRXQWDELOLW\´KDVEHHQXVHG WR UHSUHVHQWa number of different Chinese words or 
phrases and various words or phrases have been translated into English as 
³DFFRXQWDELOLW\.´ This suggests that the concept of accountability from a Chinese 
perspective is not clear.  
 
                                                 
70
  Issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission, 7 January 2001, article 59, and 
accessible at: http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/code_en.pdf (accessed on 8th July 2015). 
71
  3URWLYLWL&KLQDDQG&KLQHVH$FDGHP\RI6RFLDO6FLHQFHV³&RUSRUDWH*RYHUQDQFH$VVHVVPHQW
6XPPDU\ 5HSRUW RQ WKH 7RS  &KLQHVH /LVWHG &RPSDQLHV IRU ´ DW 
http://www.protiviti.co.uk/China-en/Documents/CN-en-2012-Corporate-Governance-Survey-
Report.pdf (accessed on 8th July 2015). 
72
  ,QWKLVFDVH³wenze´LVXVHGDVDYHUEUDWKHUWKDQDQRXQ,WLVD&KLQHVHOLQJXLVWLFUXOHWKDWWKH
YHUEZLOOEHFKDQJHGWRDQRXQE\SXWWLQJ³xing´DIWHUWKHYHUEHJ䎵䎺˄ᙗ˅.   
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Purely from the material that we have looked at above, ³wenze´, ³wenze zhi´ and ³zeren 
zhuijiu zhidu´ are the three words or phrases that appear to be translated as 
³accountability´ RU³DFFRXQWDELOLW\V\VWHP´PRVWoften. While ³zhi´ or ³zhidu´ can be 
translated as ³system´ without controversy, it is interesting to consider ³wenze´DQG
³zeren zhuijiu´LQPRUHGHWDLO 
 
The term ³wenze´can be viewed as a combination of two individual words (wen and 
ze). ³Wen´ is a word that can either be used as a verb or a noun, and is more 
appropriately used as the former here. When used as a verb it means ³enquire, ask, 
interrogate or examine,´ ZKLOH³ze´, a word that also can either be used as a verb or a 
noun, and which is more appropriately used as the latter here, means ³responsibility´. 
These two words together can deliver the meaning of the process of one party enquiring 
of another about his or her responsibilities, 73  whereas ³zeren zuijiu´ means 
investigating VRPHRQH¶V responsibility in order to ascertain if they are liable from a 
legal viewpoint. While ³wenze zhidu´ can be seen as a process of enquiring about 
responsibility and identifying possible responsibilities of someone, ³zeren zhuijiu 
zhidu´ puts more emphasis on the process of ascertaining whether there is any legal 
liability in relation to the responsibilities undertaken. Looking at the four stages 
involved in the accountability of boards in Anglo-American systems74 which were 
identified earlier, namely providing accurate information, explaining and justifying 
actions taken in relation to responsibilities, questioning and evaluating the reasons 
provided for the board¶VDFWLRQV, and the imposition of consequences, no Chinese term 
accommodates all aspects of accountability as it is understood in English. Each word 
tends to have a specialised meaning or focus that fails to be as encompassing as the 
English word. For example, ³wenze´ puts an emphasis on enquiry and the need for 
explanations, while ³zeren zhuijiu´ puts emphasis on the consequences, namely, 
liability.75   
                                                 
73
  In Chinese grammar, some strings of characters can be used as single words in some contexts, 
but are separable in others. Many English intransitive verbs are translated by verb+noun compounds, 
such as 䰞䍓 ³wenze´³WREHDFFRXQWDEOH´OLWHUDOO\³WRHQTXLUHDERXWWKHUHVSRQVLELOLWLHV´, which may 
be regarded as single lexical words, although the two parts can become separated by aspect markers. 
74
  $.HD\DQG-/RXJKUH\³%RDUG$FFRXQWDELOLW\LQ&RUSRUDWH*RYHUQDQFH´ Legal 
Studies 252. 
75
  It is fair to say that there are many words that are often seen as synonyms for accountability in 
(QJOLVKDQG³OLDELOLW\´LVRQHRIWKHP0'XEQLFN	.<DQJµ7KH3XUVXLWRI$FFRXQWDELOLW\3URPLVH
3UREOHPV DQG3URVSHFWV¶ LQ '&0HQ]HO	+/:KLWH HGQV The State of Public Administration: 
Issues, Challenges and Opportunities (Routledge  2011), 171 at 185. . Some see liability as a dimension 
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Having said this, it is argued that OLNHWKH(QJOLVKZRUG³DFFRXQWDELOLW\´, the Chinese 
ZRUG³wenze´ accommodates reasonably broad dimensional connotations and certainly 
broader than ³zhuijiu´This is affirmed by the fact that there are derivations of wen        
(䰞) in many other words, such as ³jieda 䀓ㆄ´ (ask, enquire), ³xunwen 䈒䰞´ 
(question), ³shenxunᇑ䇟´ (examine), ³ganyu ᒢ亴´ (manage) and even ³zhuijiu 䘭ウ´ 
(hold responsible). These derivations are related to some elements of accountability as 
the term is perceived in English.  
   
C. ³Wenze´ 
 
³Wenze´ appears to be a critical word in two respects. It is used in the Chinese to 
translate accountability and it is translated by Chinese writers and in reports as 
accountability. Thus, we now move to discussing ³wenze´ in the context of the literature 
surrounding corporate governance and business management to determine its scope and 
application. In particular we investigate the term ³wenze zhi´, which, as mentioned 
earlier, FDQEHWUDQVODWHGDV³DFFRXQWDELOLW\system´.  
 
Professor Chen Zhibin, Professor of Accounting from Nanjing University, has argued 
WKDW ³wenze zhi´ LV D V\VWHP LPSOHPHQWLQJ balanced rights and responsibility 
mechanisms via an institutionalised questioning process.76 He refers to this process as 
D ³wenze system´ and it includes the following: a rigorous scientific assessment of 
rights and fulfilling the corresponding obligations; noticing irresponsible actions and 
decisions in a timely fashion; and pursuing appropriate punishments based on breaches 
of duties. +HGHVFULEHGWKH³wenze system´ as one that clarifies and balances rights and 
responsibilities through a systematic enquiry process in order to minimise risks from 
the actions of internal management.77  
 
                                                 
RIDFFRXQWDELOLW\-.RSSHOOµ3DWKRORJLHVRI$FFRXQWDELOLW\ ,&$11DQG WKH&KDOOHQJHRI µ0XOWLSOH
$FFRXQWDELOLWLHV'LVRUGHU¶¶Public Administration Review 94 at 96. 
76
  =&KHQµ(IIHFWLYH(QIRUFHPHQWRI$FFRXQWDELOLW\DQG,QWHUQDO&RQWURO¶Accounting 
Research VHHDOVR=&KHQDQG=&KHQµ$FFRXQWDELOLW\DQG9DOLGLW\RI5HQRYDWLRQ6WUXFWXUH
in State-RZQHG(QWHUSULVHV¶ in S. Cheng and C. Liu, Management Sciences and Global Strategies in the 
21st Century (Macao: Macao University of Science and Technology) 2004. 
77
  =&KHQµ(IIHFWLYH(QIRUFHPHQWRI$FFRXQWDELOLW\DQG,QWHUQDO&RQWURO¶Accounting 
Research 9.  
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In one of the most influential newspapers in China, the 3HRSOH¶V 'DLO\ Ӫ≁ᰕᣕ
Renmin Ribao), it has been argued by Professor Li Weian, one of the most eminent 
Chinese scholars in the field of corporate governance, that the key issue in promoting 
corporate governance is accountability.78 +HH[SOLFLWO\XVHGWKHZRUG³wenze´ZKHQKH
accommodated WKH LGHDRIDFFRXQWDELOLW\ LQKLVDUJXPHQW+HDOVRDUJXHG WKDW³UHDO
aFFRXQWDELOLW\ LQ FRUSRUDWH JRYHUQDQFH´ LV D SURFHVV RI ³FROOHFWLYH GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ
ZLWK LQGLYLGXDOL]HG DFFRXQWDELOLW\´79 This accommodates the notion of boards and 
board members being accountable both collectively and individually, with 
individualised liabilities. For instance, individual directors can be held liable if they 
breach their duties when acquiescing to a particular course of action taken by the 
board.80 In contemporary research on corporate governance in China and elsewhere, 
³SHUVRQDO DFFRXQWDELOLW\´ WRJHWKHU ZLWK VWHZDUGVKLS DUH FRUH HOHPHQWV RI LQWHUQDO
control and may be more important than performance measurement, efficiency or even 
profit. 81  That also reflects the understandLQJ RI WKH ³wenze system´ in China in 
KLJKOLJKWLQJ WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI ³mingxi bing jiehe quanze (᰾Რᒦ㔃ਸᵳ䍓 )´ 
(clarifying what a person has done but also connecting the rights of the person to his or 
her responsibility). 
 
 Shuqing Guo, former Chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC), pointed out in his speech at the 10th Corporate Governance Forum that 
³HQKDQFLQJ RYHUVLJKW DQG DFFRXQWDELOLW\ RI FRQWUROOLQJ VKDUHKROGHUV GLUHFWRUV
supervisors and executLYHV´LVinstrumental to improving corporate governance, which 
will in turn promote the competitiveness of Chinese companies. The Chinese word that 
                                                 
78
  : /L µ&RUSRUDWH 5HVSRQVLELOLW\ DQG ,PSRUWDQFH RI (VWDEOLVKLQJ  DQ (IILFLHQW &RUSRUDWH
*RYHUQDQFH6\VWHP&RQVWUXFWLRQ¶ 3HRSOH¶V'DLO\th November 2008; ˄ᵾ㔤ᆹ, Աъን䍓,ࡦᓖᔪ䇮
ᱟޣ䭞ˈӪ≁ᰕᣕ˅2008-11-6, available via paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/.../content_133517.htm 
79
  : /L µ&RUSRUDWH 5HVSRQVLELOLW\ DQG ,PSRUWDQFH RI (VWDEOLVKLQJ  DQ (IILFLHQW &RUSRUDWH
Governance System ᵾ㔤ᆹ, Աъን䍓,ࡦᓖᔪ䇮ᱟޣ䭞¶ th November 2008, page 5; the Chinese 
YHUVLRQ RI WKH DUWLFOH XVHG WKH ZRUGV ³geren wenze њӪ䰞䍓´ WR GHOLYHU WKH LGHD RI LQGLYLGXDOLVed 
accountability. 
80
  See Articles 147±149 of Chinese Company Law 2005; see also some reported cases such as Tan 
0R/L0R/L0R''DQZHLY/LXODQ3HRSOH¶V+LJKHVW&RXUW Shenyang Tekesi Company 
v Zhang Mo (Shanghai Second Intermediate Court 2011 No. 1836); Tan Hui v Li Jia (Beijing Second 
Intermediate Court 2011 No. 16710); Shenzhen Long Digit Control Technique Company v. Li Da 
6KHQ]KHQ %DR¶DQ 'LVWULFW &RXUW  1R  Ningbo Dahongying Medical Company v Shen 
Yongren (Zhejiang Province High Court, 2009 No, 1212); Shanghai Weigela Printing Equipment 
Company v Andreas Albert & Uhlemayer (Shanghai First Intermediate Court 2009 No. 33). 
81
 0- -RQHV µ,QWHUQDO &RQWURO $FFRXQWDELOLW\ DQG &RUSRUDWH *RYHUQDQFH 0HGLHYDO DQG 0RGHUQ
Britain CoPSDUHG¶Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 1052.  
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Guo used and was translated as accountability waV³wenze (䰞䍓´82 This adds to what 
we have already documented concerning the Chinese words used to indicate 
accountability, and leads us to think that ³wenze´RU³wenze zhi´KDve been broadly 
used in the domain of corporate governance and accounting by academics and 
government officers when trying to establish a link, or clarify the differences, between 
rights, responsibility and liability.  
 
,WLVFRPPRQO\DJUHHGWKDW³wenze´LVcritical to promoting the corporate governance 
system in China after the financial crisis of 2008.83 However, wenze does not cover the 
full ambit of accountability, as the word was defined earlier and is used in the English 
sense, in relation to the elements of disclosure and justification by an accountor. The 
emphasis of ³wenze´ is very much on the role of the accountees and what they should 
be doing by way of making enquiry concerning the actions of the accountor, rather than 
the role of the accountor in reporting and justifying what has been done.  
 
It might be possible, due to the multiple derivations of the term, for D³wenze system´ 
to be developed along with the Chinese corporate governance system so as to secure a 
sound and effective accountability system, remembering that many Chinese sources 
have referred to the need for accountability in corporate governance. 7KH ³wenze 
system´ can be considered from a few perspectives, including consideration of the ones 
who engage in ³wenze´QDPHO\ the accountees (those who enquire and then assess 
explanations given to them), and the content, mechanism and scope RI³wenze.´ 
 
The main constituents who should be seen as the ones to whom accountability is owed 
would be shareholders. This follows from Article 46 of Chinese Company Law 2005 
and other uses of the word where it is able to be translated as accountability. The 
possible reasons for enquiry within the ³wenze system´ may include various issues such 
                                                 
82
  &KDLUPDQ *XR 6KXTLQJ¶V 6SHHFK DW WKH WK &RUSRUDWH *RYHUQDQFH )RUXP µ&RUSRUDWH
*RYHUQDQFH DQG &DSLWDO 0DUNHW 6RSKLVWLFDWLRQ $UH 0XWXDOO\ 5HLQIRUFLQJ¶ DYDLODEOH YLD
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/201208/t20120815_213799.htm and Chinese 
version of the speech is available via 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/bgt/xwdd/201112/t20111219_203915.htm  (both accessed on 8th 
July 2015) 
83
  ;*RQJµ3HUSOH[LW\DQG&RXQWHUPHDVXUHVRI-XGLFLDO,QWHUYHQWLRQLQ&RUSRUDWH*RYHUQDQFe in 
China ± 1HZ7KLQNLQJXQGHUWKH%DFNJURXQGRI)LQDQFLDO&ULVLVRI:DOO6WUHHW¶Tribune of 
Political Science and Law 8. 
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as checking resolutions and decisions made by the board, ascertaining decisions 
concerning the GLUHFWRUV¶ UHPXQHUDWLRQ monitoring the discharging of duties of 
directors, or other general strategic management policies. For example, based on Article 
97 of Chinese Company Law 2005 there are several accountability mechanisms 
provided, such as the fact that the shareholders of a company limited by shares are given 
WKH ULJKW WR ³ORRN LQWR WKH DUWLFOHV RI DVVRFLDWLRQ RI WKH FRPSDQ\ WKH UHJLVWHU RI
shareholders«PLQXWHVRIVKDUHKROGHUV¶JHQHUDOPHHWLQJVUHVROXWLRQVRIPHHWLQJVRI
the board of directors and the board of supervisors« financial and accounting reports, 
DQGWRPDNHVXJJHVWLRQVRULQTXLULHVDERXWWKHEXVLQHVVRSHUDWLRQVRIWKHFRPSDQ\´ 
 
The procedure RI³wenze´ZLOODOVRbe regulated by the Chinese Company Law 2005, 
especially through stipulations in relation to VKDUHKROGHUV¶PHHWLQJVDQG WKH OLDELOLW\
and dismissal of directors.84 Therefore, the subject body, content and procedure of a 
³wenze´V\VWHPin the context of corporate governance will work together to facilitate 
an effective accountability mechanism as far as China is concerned. This will provide 
investors with the means to query and assess the actions of the board and its committees 
in order to make them accountable for their decisions and actions. However, thus far 
WKLV ³wenze system´ has not been introduced in legislative documents in China. 
Hitherto, tKHLGHDVRI³wenze´RU a ³wenze system´ are only discussed academically or 
within the domain of administrative law or administrative management. It will be 
positive and useful for China to introduce the system in relation to corporate governance 
in order to make important LVVXHV VXFK DV GLUHFWRUV¶ GXWLHV DQG VKDUHKROGHUV¶ ULJKWV
subject to more effective and logical enforcement. Overall a wenze system would 
enhance corporate governance in China. 
 
D. The Empirical Position 
 
We have already noted that there are elements of accountability of boards in the 
provisions of the Company Law 2005. What the paper does now is to consider whether 
accountability has been embraced in the corporate governance sphere. In this respect 
we have considered some of the corporate reports and other documents published by 
Chinese companies that are available on the official websites of the company in order 
                                                 
84
  See Articles 98±107, 146 and 149, Chinese Company Law 2005.  
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to identify the extent to which the µODZon the books¶KDs been translated into practice, 
how has the English term accountability has been accommodated in practice and to 
evaluate the appropriateness of the usage of accountability. We believe these corporate 
reports, which are available via official website for presentation purposes and to provide 
disclosure of corporate governance issues, and which include CSR, financial reporting 
and integrated reports, are trustworthy and reflect the genuine usage of the terms in 
companies when considering their corporate governance structure and corporate 
management strategies. These reports are normally professionally drafted, internally 
and externally scrutinised and translated by experts. There are, in our opinion, no 
documents available that are more reliable or can better illuminate how the notion of 
accountability has been currently adopted and employed in Chinese companies, and 
they could well be more accurate than data obtained from interviews as they are 
available to the public and able to be assessed widely. Both SOEs and non-SOEs from 
various industries were carefully selected in order to ensure that we consider data from 
a balanced range of companies. This is one of few ways that could enable one to 
ascertain what the position is in relation to corporate governance practice. This section, 
rather than a survey on corporate documents and academic writings on the notion of 
accountability, problems, misinterpretations, and inadequacy of how has value of 
accountability been enforced and considered in practice, aims to identify the gap 
between the notion of systematic accountability on the one hand, and the realisation of 
the term in practice, on the other, and endeavours to fill in this gap both here and in the 
rest of the paper.    
 
We chose a number of large listed companies from different types of industries 
including the energy, telecommunications, transportation, banking, motor vehicle, 
pharmaceutical, airline, insurance, food,  emerging technology sectors and mixed 
industry in order to determine how,  to what extent  and in what ways the notion of 
accountability has been embraced by companies. We studied both the Chinese and 
English versions of these reports in order to ascertain how relevant are the Chinese 
terms that we proposed in relation to the ³wenze´ RU ³wenze zhi (system´ to 
accountability in practice.  First, we examined the reports of SOEs. The Annual Report 
and Account 2014 WLWOHG ³Reform, Transformation, Management´ of the China 
Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec Group), a super-large petroleum and 
petrochemical company in China and ranked second in the Fortune Global 500 in 2014, 
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reported on the LVVXHVVXUURXQGLQJ³DFFRXQWDELOLW\DQGDXGLWLQJ´DORQJVLGHPDWWHUVVXFK
as the work of the boards of directors and remuneration in the corporate governance 
sub-section of the report. It is provided that accountability should be achieved through 
accurate financial reporting with full responsibilities being imposed for false and 
misleading statements with internal control framework and self-assessment measures 
being put in place to support this. 85  The CSR Report 2014 of the China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), ranked fourth in the Fortune Global 500 in 2013 
provided that the company integrates ³HFRQRPLFHQYLURQPHQWDODQGsocial objectives 
into performance evaluations RI VHQLRU H[HFXWLYHV´ ZKR DUH ³DFFRXQWDEOH IRU +6(
PLVFRQGXFW´ when discussing stakeholders engagement, particularly on how to 
consolidate safety and environmental protection´86  
 
When reporting on the management of health and safety risk, the 2010 Sustainability 
Report of the China Ocean Shipping Group (COSCO) mentioned the implementation 
RID³VDIHSURGXFWLRQDFFRXQWDELOLW\V\VWHP´ when discussing management of health 
and safety risk as part of its risk management system, and this was stated to be one of 
WKHFRPSDQ\¶VJRDOV87 In the same report, the notion of accountability is also embedded 
as one of the performance indicators IRUWKHFRPSDQ\¶VERDUG88.  
 
Since food safety has become one of the topics that attracted much attention, especially 
after the San Lu Milk Powder scandal involving 700 tons of San Lu baby milk powder 
being contaminated with melamine to meet company standards for the protein content 
in order to achieve the short-term interests of the shareholders, we also examined the 
reports of one of the biggest food manufacturing companies, China Agri-Industries 
Holdings Limited (or China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs 
Corporation/COFCO). In the corporate governance report contained within the 2013 
$QQXDO5HSRUWLWLVGLVFORVHGWKDW³Whe company recognises the importance of corporate 
transparency and accountability´ in order to achieve a high standard of corporate 
governance practices and an accountable management framework in order to enhance 
                                                 
85
  7KH&KLQHVHZRUGXVHGKHUHIRUDFFRXQWDELOLW\ZDV³wenze (䰞䍓´ 
86
  +HUHWKHZRUG³DFFRXQWDELOLW\´WUDQVODWHGWKH&KLQHVHSKUDVH³wenze jizhi (䰞䍓ᵪࡦ´ 
87
  7KHFRUUHVSRQGLQJ&KLQHVHSKUDVHXVHGKHUHIRUDFFRXQWDELOLW\V\VWHPZDV³wenze zhi (䰞䍓
ࡦ´ 
88
  7KHFRUUHVSRQGLQJ&KLQHVHZRUGWRDFFRXQWDELOLW\ZDV³zeren˄䍓ԫ˅´. 
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the interests of shareholders. The notion of accountability was also discussed in relation 
to the audit function as part of the GLUHFWRUV¶UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV89  
 
In the CSR Report 2011 of China Southern Power Grid (CSG), it is mentioned that 
accountability is regarded as a core value and the accountee in the accountability 
process is every stakeholder.90  In the Baosteel Group CSR Report 2012, the term 
³(FRQRPLFDFFRXQWDELOLW\DXGLW´ZDV used to discuss one of the auditing systems.91 In 
the same report, the accountability system that is provided for LVUHJDUGHGDV³WKHEDVLF´
for a close-loop management mode to combat corruption.92  The Interim Report of the 
,QGXVWULDODQG&RPPHUFLDO%DQNRI&KLQDHPSOR\HGWKHWHUP³RSHUDWLRQDl management 
DFFRXQWDELOLW\´ as part of an attempt to improve IT management.93  
 
In order to enhance transparency, it is emphasized in the annual report 2013 of Shanghai 
Automobile and Industrial Corporation that policies of accountability for significant 
errors made in information disclosure have been introduced.94 In the annual report of 
China Mobile Limited 2014, when discussing, internal audit in the corporate 
governance section of the annual report, it is reported that the company promoted 
accountability in order to hold officers accountable, and in appropriate cases impose 
penalties 95 . China Merchants Holding Limited, developed from the first private 
company that was registered in 1872 during the Qing dynasty, is one of the companies 
that we studied that is involved in a mixture of industries including transportation, 
finance and real estate. In its annual report of WLWOHG³*URZLQJIURP6WUHQJWKWR
6WUHQJWK´accountability was used as one of the 16 principles of corporate governance 
WKDW UHJXODWHV WKH FRPSDQ\¶V OLIH. Accountability was important DV ³Whe Board is 
committed to providing shareholders with a balanced and understandable assessment 
RIWKH&RPSDQ\¶Vfinancial performance, position, and prospects via announcement of 
its quarterly, interim aQGIXOO\HDUILQDQFLDOUHVXOWV´96  
                                                 
89
  7KHFRUUHVSRQGLQJ&KLQHVHSKUDVHXVHGKHUHIRUDFFRXQWDELOLW\V\VWHPZDV³ZHQ]H]KL䰞䍓
ࡦ´DQG³wenze (䰞䍓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Apart from SOEs, we also observed some non-state owned companies in order to look 
at how the notion of accountability has been adopted where there is less impact from 
administrative governance. IQWKH&RUSRUDWH*RYHUQDQFHUHSRUWRI+XDZHL³WKH&(2
DFFRXQWDELOLW\V\VWHP´ZDVPHQWLRQHGXQGHUWKHOHDGHUVKLSRIERDUGRIGLUHFWRUVDQG
³FOHDU DXWKRUL]DWLRQ DQG DFFRXQWDELOLW\ RI UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV´ ZDV KLJKOLJhted as a 
characteristic RI³DZHOO-estabOLVKHGJRYHUQDQFHVWUXFWXUH´Moreover, Part 2 of CSR 
report 2014 of China Minsheng Bank discussed the transformation on nature and 
attitudes towards CSR from being purely voluntary and philanthropic responsibilities 
to the expected responsibilities of board from their stakeholders with possible liabilities 
in order to disclose corporate actions towards stakeholders, including some of them 
need special attention in China including small and medium enterprises, non-state-
owned enterprises, rural community, employees, environment  and public welfare.97 In 
the corporate governance report of 2014 of Ping An Insurance Company of China, the 
importance of the ³IRUPXODWLRQ DQG LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI an accountability system for 
major errors,´which had been introduced in 2010, was reaffirmed. When discussing 
³WKHDVVHVVPHQWDQGHYDOXDWLRQof the UHPXQHUDWLRQV\VWHP´WKH³Dccountability results 
are closely linked to the long-term and short-term award and appointment and removal 
of cadres´ZKLFKLVFORVHO\UHODWHGWRWKHfourth stage of  the notion of accountability 
discussed in Part II. Furthermore, ³a risk prevention and control accountability system´
was established in relation to ³Investment Risk Management´98  
 
In the corporate governance report (contained within the annual report) of Shanghai 
)RVXQ 3KDUPDFHXWLFDO FRPSDQ\ LW LV HPSKDVLVHV WKDW ³WKH Eoard believes that high 
corporate governance standards are essential in providing a framework for the Group 
to safeguard the interests of shareholders and to enhance corporate value and 
DFFRXQWDELOLW\´99 ,QWKHDQQXDOUHSRUWRI+DLQDQ$LUOLQHWKHQRWLRQRI³accountability´ 
was employed as a means to promote safety management.100 
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  7KHSKUDVH³wenze du (䰞䍓ᓖ´ZDVXVHGLQWKH&KLQHVHYHUVLRQRIWKHUHSRUW and du means 
degree of in Chinese.  
100
  7KHSKUDVH³wenze (䰞䍓´ZDVXVHGLQWKH&KLQHVHYHUVLRQRIWKHUHSRUW 
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In addition there are a number of statements by Chinese scholars that indicate that there 
is some kind of accountability going on in the corporate governance field.  For example, 
Li Weian, as indicated above, has indicated that there is accountability in the Chinese 
system. Shi has argued that weak accountability is regarded as one of the major 
corporate governance problems in China. 101  Zhu has discussed the existence of 
accountability and identified problems and the necessity of effective enforcement of an 
accountability system. 102 Sun and Tobin have noted that Chinese companies enhanced 
their accountability after cross-listing in foreign stock exchanges.103  
 
We can see from the discussions above that accountability has been adopted in various 
ways to deliver the notion of responsibilities which are accompanied by possible 
liability. Accountability is widely used in various reports and in academic literature in 
the area of corporate governance. As for the corporate reports, the notion of 
accountability is mostly embedded within the CSR report, or corporate governance 
section of the annual report. The term was employed to disclose that the boards are 
made responsible in relation to various parties including shareholders and stakeholders 
and to demonstrate a clear mechanism of liabilities with internal control, especially 
when the accountability system was discussed and used in relation to the auditing 
system, risk management and product safety management. The term accountability was 
used to deliver the meaning of one, or more than one, stage(s) of the four stages of 
accountability discussed in Section II, but not all of them. The concern is that the 
Chinese equivalent of accountability in these documents is not consistent. The 
understanding of the nature and scope of the notion of accountability in both the 
corporate and academic world is also inconsistent, incomplete and far from being 
systematic.  
 
E. $³Wenze 6\VWHP´ 
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Accountability is clearly not something that is limited to corporate governance in either 
Anglo-American jurisdictions or in China. Political reforms through the introduction of 
an accountability system, that is, a ³wenze system´ were introduced in China in order 
to make government officials more responsive to societal demands and more 
accountable for their performance as civil servants. Government institutions have been 
established for this purpose, including legislative oversight committees, supervision 
committees, party discipline committees, and internal administration reconsideration 
procedures. An accountability system for government officials (³ganbu wenze zhi ᒢ䜘
䰞䍓ࡦ´) is regarded as the most important of these.104 Government officials will face 
an enquiry process which may lead to tough penalties or dismissal. The importance 
placed on the enquiry process within this ³wenze system´ is regarded as the result of 
government officials not being accountable for their decisions. The development of the 
market economy makes the government¶V accountability reforms particularly important 
as China becomes increasingly open and diverse.  
 
In relation to corporate governance, it is recognised that in Chinese listed companies, 
GLUHFWRUV¶UHVSRQVLELOLWLHVneed to be clarified in order to make their enforceability more 
credible. The professionalism and competitiveness of Chinese directors on both the 
executive and supervisory boards has been questioned, and reforms through corporate 
governance mechanisms and corporate law changes have been recommended.105 These 
problems are widely recognised in China from the perspective of government officials, 
especially in relation to the actions of directors in SOEs.  
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The concept of a wenze accountability system gives XVRSSRUWXQLWLHVWRGHYHORS³wenze´
in a manner that will benefit the development of the Chinese corporate governance 
system as an economic model, which is the direction China is heading. Unlike the 
essence of ³wenze´LWVHOIthe wenze system could include dimensions with a rather wide 
scope relating to a process of balancing rights and responsibilities through enquiry and 
disclosure. The system requires directors to be accountable to the company and it 
includes, in a logical order, the following three broad dimensions:106 the directors being 
responsible and exercising due diligence (³jinze ቭ䍓´or ³lüze ን䍓´); directors 
clarifying and providing information concerning their responsibility and setting 
standards, explaining, analysing and justifying the responsibility they have been given 
(³mingze ᰾䍓´); and ³wenze´ in a narrow sense, focusing on enquiry relative to the 
actions of the accountor (³wenze 䰞䍓´). The realisation and enforcement of the process 
RI ³wenze´ GRHV LPSO\ WKHVH dimensions, and these three related aspects have been 
practically and widely used to explain the wenze system. For example, it is argued by 
Wang Tie, Party secretary of Xinyang City, that Party committees and governments of 
all levels should understand the close relationship between clarifying their 
responsibilities (³mingze ᰾䍓´), exercising due diligence (³jinze ቭ䍓´ or Āloze ን
䍓ā) and making enquiries concerning the actions of the accountor (³wenze 䰞䍓´) in 
order to build a harmonious and peaceful society through the wenze system.107 Another 
example is that the accountability issue is emphasized in the Guidelines for the Internal 
Control of Recommendations for Business drafted by the CSRC, which put forward 
requirements in relation to systems concerning due diligence, working papers, work 
diaries, internal examinations and continuous inspections as specified in the Measures 
for the Administration of Securities Issuance and Listing Recommendations for 
Business.108 The accountability system is introduced in Section 5 (3) through three 
components and dimensions including ³mingze (᰾䍓)´, ³jinze (ቭ䍓)´ and ³wenze (䰞
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  Speech by Wang Tie, party secretary of Xinyang City on 17th August 2009; available via 
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  Guidelines for the Internal Control of Recommendation Business (؍㦀ъ࣑޵䜘᧗ࡦᤷᕅ) 
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䍓)´.109 In relation to directors, Mr. Yin Jiaxu, Chairman of the Board of the China 
North Industries Group Corporation, which ranks 152nd on the 2014 Fortune Global 500 
list, argued in a group discipline committee training meeting in July to August 2014 in 
Beijing that Party committee members and members of the board at all levels should 
clarify their responsibilities, exercise due diligence with respect to their responsibilities, 
and be accountable for their decisions.110 It is highlighted that, in order to enforce and 
implement the accountability system, ³mingze (᰾䍓)´ is the foundation, ³lüze (ን䍓)´ 
is the key to ensure the achievement of assigned tasks, and ³wenze (䰞䍓)´ can be 
regarded as the safeguard.  
 
The logical flow of these three dimensions of a ³wenze system´ described above is 
important to bridge the expectation gap that exists between what is perceived as the 
roles to be played by the board of directors and the reality of actual board performance, 
something that is also needed in Anglo-American corporate governance.  
 
The broad scope of the ³wenze system´ seems to come close to covering the four stages 
of accountability discussed at the outset, because this system as developed in 
administrative management includes providing accurate information concerning its 
decisions and actions (³xize ᷀䍓´), explaining and justifying that for which it is 
responsible (³mingze ᰾䍓´), questioning and evaluating of the reasons provided by the 
board (³zhize 䍘䍓´) and the imposition of consequences (³chengze ᜙䍓´ or ³baoze 
㽂䍓´). 
 
This ³wenze system´ can be regarded as a trend that should be adopted in relation to 
Chinese corporate governance in order for China to develop its own unique 
accountability system based on a constantly changing and distinctive corporate 
governance model and one that is becoming close to economic governance. The 
proposed system could possibly be included within the next Code of Corporate 
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Governance for Listed Companies in China (the Code), the present one being arguably 
out of date as it was introduced in 2001.111  
 
Thus, it is not suggested here that the Anglo-American concept of accountability  should 
be transplanted to Chinese corporate governance. While scholarly understanding of 
legal translating, as a ubiquitous form of legal development, is fairly rudimentary,112 
what is clear is that when considering whether concepts that operate in one jurisdiction 
should be applied in another there can be difficulty in transplanting those concepts 
because of a variety of factors such as the political system, culture, history, law 
enforcement and socio-economics.113 Whether concepts, like accountability which is a 
value, can be transplanted is probably a matter that is likely to be subject to aspects of 
the same debate that exists with respect to the transplantation of legal rules. In line with 
the views espoused in relation to legal transplantation, some scholars, known as 
transferists, may argue that concepts like accountability are equally at home anywhere 
where there is human endeavour and community if the concept is a good and 
appropriate one, 114  while others, known as culturalists, might argue that it is not 
possible to effect a transplanting,115 as one cannot transport human meanings from one 
culture to another.116 If the successful legal transplant means using the imported legal 
rules in the same way that they are used in the home country subject to adaptions and 
local conditions,117 we submit that there is a middle ground where, as in this case, an 
accountability system can be developed that draws on the concept of accountability as 
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provided for in other places, but at the same time one that PHVKHVZLWK&KLQD¶VFXOWXUH
and politics and meets its specific needs in order to establish an accountability system 
with Chinese characteristics. If a concept that has been emphasised and developed in a 
foreign country is able to serve another country well or is able to contribute to the 
GHYHORSPHQW RI D FRXQWU\¶V RZQ DSSOLFDWLRQ RI WKH FRQFHSW WKHQ WKH RULJLQ RI WKH
concept is not relevant.118 Pursuant to the middle ground approach we advocate it is not 
DSUREOHPLIWKHUHFLSLHQWFRXQWU\¶VDSSUHFLDWLRQRIWKHRULJLQDOFRQFHSWLVIODZHGDVWKH
country will not be endeavouring to stick slavishly to it in any event, but developing 
what it feels is best and most suitable for its particular circumstances. 
 
It is argued that the development of this unique wenze system would reflect the fact that 
China is likely to develop its own form of accountability because the development of 
its corporate governance is affected by path dependence. This is a comparatively 
modern idea that originated in the 1980s, and it provides that an outcome or decision is 
shaped in specific and systematic ways by the historical path leading to it, as well as by 
other factors within the socio-economic context.119 While convergence theorists predict 
that countries, especially countries with weak legal systems, will adopt certain legal 
rules that have been demonstrably efficient in other jurisdictions, theorists who adhere 
to path dependence normally argue that divergence between systems will still exist 
because legal rules are shaped by pre-existing political and social forces.120 As part of 
the domestic legal and financial framework, a corporate law system has significant 
sources of path dependence, which include historical accidents as well as economic and 
political particulars of the domestic system. 121  The persistence of these sources 
significantly contributes to the stability of the domestic corporate governance system 
in any local socio-economic environment.  
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,WLVUHFRJQLVHGWKDWD³RQHVL]HILWs DOO´DSSURDFKZLOOQRWZRUNEHFDXVHRIWKHH[LVWHQFH
of path dependence.122 Countries with emerging markets should avoid simply copying 
legislation and codes implemented in mature markets as they are likely to be 
inappropriate. The most appropriate and effective regulatory framework will greatly 
GHSHQGRQKRZHYROYHGDFRXQWU\¶VPDUNHWVOHJDOV\VWHPDQGJRYHUQmental institutions 
are, as well as the nature of its history and culture. 123  Also of importance is the 
shareholding ownership structure for that is often unique to each nation and which 
presents its own unique agency problems that each country will normally have to 
confront. Deniz correctly points out WKDW³FRS\LQJa code from one country to another 
without analysing the details of a corporate governance system or considering the 
DSSOLFDELOLW\WRDVSHFLILFFRXQWU\¶VMXGLFLDOV\VWHPRUHQVXULQJHIIHFWLYHHQIorcement, 
ZLOOQRWEULQJWKHH[SHFWHGEHQHILWDQGUHIRUPWRWKDWFRXQWU\´124  
Path dependence theory can be regarded as a theoretical base for the adoption of a 
notion of accountability with unique characteristics within a unique corporate 
governance model, WDNLQJLQWRDFFRXQWDQDWLRQ¶Vcorporate law, enforcement process, 
shareholder structure, civil procedure, stage of economic development and other 
aspects including culture, history and traditions. The existing values present in a nation 
will block changes and generate path dependence. It has been argued by Bebchuk and 
Roe that the initial ownership structure in a country will directly influence the 
subsequent development of ownership structure and laws.125 Furthermore, they have 
developed the theory to suggest that interested parties possessing the power to influence 
ownership structure and corporate law will have both the incentive and the power to 
impede changes that might improve efficiency but are contrary to their private control 
interests.126 In China, the very high concentration of state ownership is directly linked 
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to control of the board of directors, which is regarded as a critical link between 
ownership and control in the current Chinese corporate governance scheme.127 This 
decides the uniqueness of accountability and the ways it will be adopted, appropriately 
and effectively, in a Chinese corporate governance code or Chinese company law in the 
future. While the ownership structure, corporate governance model and economy have 
developed and been transformed very rapidly in China, the concept of accountability 
will also change, assuming a form that best suits China and the promotion of the success 
of its companies. 
If the Corporate Governance Code were updated, taking into account the use of a wenze 
system, it could reflect the fact that there has been a transformation from administrative 
corporate governance to something that is closer to economic corporate governance in 
China. The move from administrative to economic corporate governance may lead to 
accountability that is of a similar ilk to that found in Anglo-American systems. However, 
in the opinion of the authors, accountability in corporate governance in China will never 
be exactly the same as that applying in Western countries. This is based on several 
reasons in addition to the general concept of path dependency discussed above. Of 
critical importance is the stage of &KLQD¶Veconomic development, and, of course, its 
unique history, culture, politics and traditions. Deng Xiaoping introduced the socialist 
market economy based on the dominance of the state-owned sector and an open-market 
economy with capitalist techniques being permitted to thrive. Deeply rooted Confucian 
philosophy, the unique guanxi and renqing traditions, government interference and 
participation in companies (especially SOEs), and the unique shareholder structure that 
resulted from privatisation are all important factors, and collectively they demand that 
the corporate governance model should be unique. 
 
So, in summary, we are suggesting that the Chinese language does not have an exact 
word that encapsulates the English word ³accountability´, particularly as employed in 
relation to corporate governance and as explained earlier in the paper. However,  we do 
think that the use of the Chinese word ³wenze´ and its derivations conceivably can 
provide a system, which we have called a ³wenze V\VWHP´, that while it mirrors some 
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of the elements of accountability as it applies in Anglo-American systems, is, more 
importantly one that will be able to be embraced in China, for the form of accountability 
that applies is never likely to be the same as in other systems around the world since 
China is developing accountability within its own unique corporate governance system 
and to address its own needs. 
 
V ³Wenze Zhi´ and Accountability in Administrative Corporate Governance and 
Administrative Law in China  
 
In this VHFWLRQWKHKLVWRU\DQGGHILQLWLRQRI³wenze zhi´ZLOOEHIXUWKHUGLVFXVVHG in the 
context of administrative law in China in order to clarify the nature and scope of the 
accounting system and to assess the appropriateness of employing the concept in the 
corporate governance field. Administrative law is used because it is in this area of law 
that accountability has been most frequently considered in China, as it has in many 
Western countries, and it has, as discussed below, had a profound influence on the 
development of corporate governance in China, as a hybrid corporate governance with 
the long-term coexistence of economic and administrative characters. This unique 
corporate governance with government interference and ³DGPLQLVWUDWLYLVDWLRQ´ RI
resource allocation, corporate objectives, and the appointment and removal of senior 
executives make the discussions of administrative law valuable and coherent without 
running a risk of diluting the discussion in the context of corporate governance. 
 
An accountability system (³wenze zhi´) was introduced as the result of the construction 
of a system of responsible government and is regarded as representing a profound 
revolution. It includes administrative ideas, development targets, government patterns 
and policy tools. 128  The establishment of an accountability mechanism and the 
safeguarding of a system standard are regarded as core concepts for the success of this 
revolution through the idea RI³SRZHUUHVWULFWHGE\SRZHU´.129 The standardisation and 
institutionalisation of this term has been essential to administrative law since the SARS 
crisis of 2003. It refers to a system in which government officials are required to take 
responsibility for their decisions and performance while subjecting themselves to the 
                                                 
128
  / ;LD µ&KLQD¶V $GPLQLVWUDWLYH 5XOH RI /DZ LQ ¶ LQ / /LQ HG The China Legal 
Development Year Book (Volume 5) (Leiden, Brill, 2010) Chapter 6 at 159. 
129
  Ibid  at 159±160. 
37 
 
scrutiny of those who entrusted and empowered them. It is introduced as a supervision 
system for the purpose of promoting administrative efficiency through enforcement 
mechanisms such as the following kinds of accountability: legal, political, management, 
and occupational ethics.130  
 
As far as government legislation is concerned, the introduction in 2009 of the ³Interim 
Provisions on the Implementation of Accountability for the Leader of the Party and 
Government (ޣҾᇎ㹼ފ᭯亶ሬᒢ䜘䰞䍓ⲴᲲ㹼㿴ᇊ )´ marked the formal 
commencement of building a more responsible government with accountability 
mechanisms. This process is regarded as a major step in enabling the strengthening of 
the legal system in order to combat corruption. It supports advocating ³clean´ 
government and improving the code of conduct for leaders, which is of great 
significance in strengthening the supervision of the work of the leaders of the party and 
government, and enhancing their sense of accountability, as well as providing a better 
implementation of the scientific outlook on development and continually improving the 
party¶s governing capacity and the art of governance.131 7KH&KLQHVHZRUG³wenze 䰞
䍓 ´ ZDV H[SOLFitly used in the title of the provision and has been translated as 
³accountability´ above. 
 
The Interim Provision was regarded as a vital step for the growth and enlargement of 
the accountability system in terms of establishing three mechanisms to ensure the full 
implementation of the system, as well as controlling and supervising public power 
within the system, namely responsibility, discipline and legal investigation.132 These 
three components of accountability work in a logical way by identifying and 
investigating responsibility, making sure the people who are responsible are directly 
disciplined, and, where they are in breach, incurring legal liability based on 
administrative law. 133  This is consistent with the stages and goals of corporate 
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governance accountability where directors are required to disclose information 
concerning their responsibilities and directors are rewarded or punished for their 
responsible or irresponsible corporate actions. 
 
This Interim Provision has been seen as very effective, since 21,464 officials have been 
held responsible for failing in their duties and causing major workplace accidents and 
serious pollution incidents in the last year, and about 182,000 officials nationwide were 
punished in China in 2013.134 While the number of convictions does not necessarily 
mean that a system is effective, the Chinese authorities have been encouraged by the 
convictions and this has led them to believe in WKH HIIHFWLYHQHVV RI ³wenze zhi´ LQ
administrative law. The highlight of the accountability system has been the introduction 
of the three-\HDU$FWLRQ3ODQRI&KLQD¶V6WDWH&RXQFLO,QIRUPDWLRQ2IILFH±2015, 
regulating accountability where there are accidents concerning product safety, food 
quality, land requisition and environmental pollution.135 The accountability system has 
been used here to require officials and others to explain their actions, and it has led to 
the imposition of liability in relation to those who infringed the interests of others 
because of dereliction of duty. The effective use of the notion here does imply the 
possibilities of adopting wenze system in corporate governance. 
 
Looking to the future, a ³ILYH\HDUSODQQLQJRXWOLQHIRUWKH&HQWUDO3DUW\5HJXODWLRQV
(2013±\HDUV´has been designed to co-ordinate arrangements for the work of the 
Central Party over the next five years, putting forward the basic requirements, 
objectives and guiding ideology. 136  It is suggested in Section 4.5 that the Interim 
Provisions will be amended to improve the accountability system. This will be 
delivered by the party in order to monitor those officials who represent it. The 
amendment should clarify, as far as party officials are concerned, the following: the 
circumstances where accountability will be required; accountability norms; the 
consistency and cooperation of legal accountability; and disciplinary rules and 
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sanctions. 7KH ZRUG ³wenze 䰞䍓´ was used in combination ZLWK ³zhidu ࡦᓖ´ 
(system)³qingkuang ᛵߥ´ FLUFXPVWDQFHVDQG³fangshi ᯩᔿ´ (norm) in the original 
Chinese documents in establishing the wenze system in administrative life. 
 
The increasing importance of the DSSOLFDWLRQRI³wenze zhi´LQDGPLQLVWUDWLYHODZLV
closely related to corporate governance, especially for SOEs where the relevant Party 
committee plays a pivotal role in the decision-making process, including the 
nomination of top executives, executive evolution and compensation, assets 
acquisition, and annual budgets.137 The State and the Party have a massive impact on 
corporate governance development and board accountability. This unique corporate 
governance system with characteristics from both administrative and economic 
governance enables the wenze system employed in administrative law to be applied in 
FRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFH:KLOHWKH³wenze zhi´UHJXODWHVFLYLOVHUYDQWVLQDGPLQLVWUDWLYH
law in China, it also regulates and supervises directors in SOEs who are often appointed 
by the State. Therefore, the accountability system in administrative law applies to 
similar people as those that are involved in the corporate governance system in China, 
especially those who are appointed to SOEs.  
 
The accountability system in Chinese administrative law is designed to promote a 
responsible government with more responsible governors, while the accountability 
system in corporate governance is established with the purpose of promoting more 
responsible boards of directors in a model with high state ownership and strong 
government involvement in corporate decisions. While the accountability system for 
administrative law applies to governors who lose the trust of the public, it can be 
observed that the accountability system for corporate governance does apply to 
directors who do not encourage and inspire competitiveness, and who are not trusted 
by the State, Party leaders, their shareholders and other related corporate constituencies.   
 
This discussion confirms the notion that board accountability in China is and will be 
different from the accountability process in other jurisdictions, just as corporate 
governance in China differs. TKHWHUP³wenze´Slaces more emphasis on the notion of 
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investigation by accountees, partly as a result of government interference, when 
compared to accountability in Anglo-American systems. An updated system of 
accountability may be developed in order to include some or all of the multiple 
dimensions as found in the English notion of accountability, which includes, apart from 
the notions of investigation, the following: information disclosure, justification and 
explanation by the board of directors for their decisions, and more efficient and 
effective legal enforcement measures to ensure the imposition of consequences from 
any investigation. $EDODQFHVKRXOGEHPDLQWDLQHGEHWZHHQ³wen´DQG³ze´, namely 
enquiry (³wen´ as a verb) and responsibility (³ze´ as a noun), and it is important to 
avoid  : enquiry without liability (³wen er bu ze 䰞㘼н䍓´); overemphasising enquiry 
(³da wen xiao ze བྷ䰞ሿ䍓´); or hiding liability through the process of enquiry (³jie 
wen yan ze ُ䰞᧙䍓´).138 In the Chinese context, taking into account the four stages 
of accountability that we have identified as applying in Anglo-American systems is 
helpful for building more accountable and efficient boards for listed companies in China. 
However, during this unique transformative period from administrative to economic 
corporate governance, the nature of board accountability is likely to change to reflect 
developments in corporate governance rules, corporate law, stock markets and their 
rulesVKDUHKROGHUV¶and GLUHFWRUV¶NQRZOHGJHDQGthe qualifications and experience of 
directors.  
 
VI Conclusion 
 
The accountability of boards is clearly seen as a critical issue in corporate governance, 
and arguably accountability has a particular meaning in this context. In Anglo-
American systems it involves disclosure and justification by a board (the accountor) as 
to what has been done, questioning by shareholders (the accountees), and then possible 
consequences being imposed on the board. This paper has sought to determine what 
kind of concept of accountability exists in Chinese corporate governance and whether 
accountability, as articulated in Anglo-American systems or something similar, has 
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EHHQHPEUDFHGLQ&KLQD:HKDYHIRXQGWKDWZKHUH³DFFRXQWDELOLW\´LVIRXQGLQ(QJOLVK
language corporate governance and other related documents, it has been translated in 
China using different Chinese words. The reverse is the case, namely several Chinese 
words have been translated as accountability when the Chinese documents have been 
translated into English. We have suggested that Chinese does not have a word that fully 
HQFDSVXODWHV WKH (QJOLVK ZRUG ³DFFRXQWDELOLW\´ HVSHFLDOO\ DV XVHG LQ UHODWLRQ WR
corporate governance. The Chinese word that has been translated most often as 
accountability is ³wenze´. +RZHYHUWKHZRUG³wenze´GRHVfocus on making enquiry 
concerning the actions of the accountor, and does not appear to embrace all of the 
nuances of the concept of accountability as determined in Anglo-American corporate 
governance.  
 
This paper has argued that while there appears to be a form of accountability in Chinese 
corporate governance, it is not equivalent to the approach adopted in Anglo-American 
jurisdictions. The paper does not suggest that China should embrace the Anglo-
$PHULFDQ DSSURDFK EXW VKRXOG HPEUDFH ZKDW ZH WHUP D ³wenze V\VWHP´ RI
accountability that will enhance corporate governance and be able to embrace a Chinese 
approach to corporate governance. This is a dynamic notion and the wenze system itself 
may change with Chinese economic development and other variable factors such as 
shareholding and board structure, and government policies. 
 
We have argued in relation to administrative law in China that there is an accountability 
system that has some similarities to that applying in Anglo-American circles, and this 
is referred to as a ³wenze system´. It has been posited here that the ³wenze system´ can 
provide a scheme of board accountability in China that will enable substantial 
accountability to take place and this will foster better corporate governance. 
 
We opine that elements of the concept and form of accountability embraced in Anglo-
American systems are likely to become more relevant in China as China moves from 
having a system totally based on administrative governance to one that is based more 
on economic governance. Nevertheless, we argue that even if China achieves this aim, 
and its governance has similarities to those applying in Anglo-American systems, it is 
never likely to embrace exactly the same concept or form of accountability as that 
applying in other systems around the world. The reason is that &KLQD¶V FRUSRUDWH
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governance system is different, and a unique form of accountability should develop to 
address the needs of corporate governance in China and the fostering of its listed 
companies. The link between Anglo-American accountability and a unique Chinese 
³wenze´ system within the unique corporate governance transformative period can be 
seen in the following figure, which summarises the way that accountability works.  
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Figure 1: Corporate governance transformation and unique 
Chinese board accountability system 
